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STATEi ~Ei.r:' CF SEi!ATCr. NIXE i·.lf.. i·1!3I.i'IE1D (D., i:-ICNT1J.11•)

o~
~
---.----FOREIGN RELATIONS:

LATE-SUHl'IER 1959

Hr. President:
It may seem at this moment a remote possibility, but at
some point the first session of the 86th Congress will come to a
close.

The first snows of l'linter will undoubtedly have settled on

the mountains of Montana by the time the final gavel falls.

It

may be that the first snows will have even descended in Washington.
Sooner or later, however, we shall finish the work of this session.
And sooner or later we shall adjourn.
I have sought the floor today in the

e~~pectation--perhaps

unwarranted--that adjournment may come sooner rather than later.
I have sought it in order to make certain summary remarks on the
international situation and the present state of the nation's
foreign relations.
It is not easy to dra't-7 up a balance sheet of this kind.
Yet the attempt to do so on other occasions, I beli eve, has been
helpful and it may prove to be helpful now.
In broad terms, I suppose, one mi ght say that since the
nati on is not f i ghting a war i n this late-summer 1959, the balance
sheet i s fine.

That sort of observati on, comforting though it may

be, tell s us nothing of the stubborn internati onal realities with
which we

w~st

live, wi th whi ch we must continue to contend.
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It may be good politics to say that the absence of fighting on our part proves how successful our foreign policy has been.
It may make for happy headlines.

It may be good politics, but I

do not know that it is good government.

This superfic:al observa-

tion produces a false sense of security in the nation.

It masks

the very likely possibility that we may be at a peace of sorts-not necessarily because of our policies, but in spite of some of
them, and that pieces may now be falling into place in the complex
pattern of international relations which, when fully assemblied,
may fuse in the full fury

of nuclear war.

The observation that we have peace, moreover, shunts aside
the domestic implications of present international policies.

It

completely ignores the grave burden of taxation, and the inflationary pressures which arise from the enormous cost of the defense
establishment and overseas activities of various kinds which are
involved in maintaining this so-called peace.

We do not know,

really, with any degree of precision the needs of any of these
operations or how efficiently any are run.

All we know is that

these defense and other operations--as much as the Congress will
allow--are pressed upon us on the grounds that they are required
to maintain this so-called peace.

At the same time, the Administra-

tion has admonished the Congress to limit the buildup of essential
domestic services and activities in education, housing, road construction, social security, slum clearance, law enforcement, resource development and countless others under a budget which goes
overwhelmingly for defense and international programs of one kind
or another.
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In short, to maintain this peace of sorts, we are eating
into--or at any rate, not building adequately--our capital investment in the social structure of the nation.

That may be unavoidable

in present circumstances but when we talk lightly of having peace-let us not lose sight of what we are doing and of the monumental
problems whichthe neglect of domestic needs is building up for the
years ahead.
lfuo can speak, in all honesty, of the existence of peace
in this late-summer of 1959 when the continent of Europe remains
divided by hostile and unreconciled ideologies and other spawns of
conflict?

vfuen the concept of live and let live which encourages

men and nations to rational settlement of their difficulties has
still so little depth in that key region?

l~en

Western Europe

shows evidence of serious fissures in its essential unity?
vfuo can spe&~, in all honesty, of peace when a wall of

ignorance builds ever higher

be~qeen

this nation and China and be-

hind it there develops a new and explosive
on hatred of the United States?

p~1er

nurtured heavily

vfuile this situation prevails, to

talk glibly about the existence of peace today may be to exact a
terrible price out of our children's tomorrow.
l~

can spe&<, in all honesty, of peace when in the great

arc of nations extending from Korea, around the rim of Asia,
through the Middle East and Africa and even into the nearby Caribbean, there are only scattered oases of stability?

l~en

in this

vast area, too often there exists a seething violence just beneath
the surface of daily life?

~en

whole peoples grow restless in the

search for new roots to feed their survival and growth?

Mr. President, by ignoring such realities as these, I
suppose one may concoct a bright balance sheet of the world situation and find in it reason to pride ourselves on the success of
our foreign policies and their administration.

Unfortunately, it

also gives us cause for national self-delusion and I, for one,
cannot certify to any such balance sheet.

Equally, I cannot join

those who, seeing only such realities as I have just enumerated,
are plunged into a cynical gloom, a deadening hopelessness over the
fate of the nation and mankind.
No, Nr. President, I do not believe that we can conclude,
from the present situation, either the certainty of a durable peace
and continued progress, or the inevitability of retrogression and
tragic war.

The international situation in late-summer 1959, as

it has been for some time, is nei ther black nor t-lhite but many
shades of gray.

It would be best to dispell any illusions that

we have peace in our times and count mankind lucky that 't"le even
have peace for this day.
As a nation, we are still in the midst of a gigantic
and enormously expensive holding action throughout the world.

At

some critical points in this action there are rays of hope that
potential conflicts will yield to reason or, at least, that the
vast cost of the holding action can be reduced.

At others, we are

staging merely a rear-guard action in which the way to a durable
peace i s not yet even dimly seen.
We will do well, therefore, to put aside the glib evaluation of the state of the world as being one of peace in this latesunmer of 1959 and the state of our foreign policy as being one of

- 5 -

success.

At best,

th~

world and this nation as a part of it, has

just barely got its head above water.

If there is any broad

generalization that is applicable, it is that

·w~

are in a period of

change in which we may go down or up but one in which--in any event-we cannot remain just where we are.

In these circumstances we shall

increase our prospects of finding the way up, the

w~

to peace, only

as we turn our attention to the specifics, to the principal problems
which confront us in the world.

shall find our way only as we

Vle

try to gauge accurately the changing content of these problems, only
as we eJtamine and reeJtamine honestly the present policies by which
we are seeking to deal with these problems and weigh and re-weigh
the effectiveness of the adminmtration of these policies.

In short,

in an era of change in international relations we need to understand
clearly the possibilities of the change and be prompt to act on
them.

If we fail to do so

~~e

shall be left high and dry as the tide

of change moves on and away from us.

Germany
In one critical area, Nr. President, in Gei..'"lllany, the pressu_!:e for change is great and it is rising.

It is fed by developments

within Germany, within Europe, perhaps even within the Soviet Union
itself.
VIe

may now be in a position to deal more successfully with

these pressures than in the past.

Dy successfully, let me add, I

mean we may be able to deal with them in a way that leads towards
a more durable peace without prejudice to freedom.

Certainly, Mr.

- 6 President, during the 86th Congress we have sharpened the tools of
foreign policy for coping with the complex German situation.
policies have been recast.

Our

Hithout aleration in basic principle,

they have been redesigned more closely in line 't'lith the realities
of the Germany and Europe of 1959 rather than of 1950 or 1945.

In

a phrase, we have refurbished these policies and brought them up to
date.
True, the division in nerlin, Germany and, in a larger
sense, in Europe has not yet ended.

nut at least, the revisions

of our policy have helped to deflect, for the present, the headlong
plunge towards open conflict in Berlin.

At least, there is now

some chance that the exchanges of heads and near-heads of states
may set in motion more tangible action on peace than the generalities which emerged from Geneva in 1955.

There is no guarantee that

such will be the result but at least the hope is alive.
There is credit enough for all in this achievement.

It

is due in no small measure to the final efforts of the late Secretary of State.
s~Atements

In his last visit to Europe and in his final press

Mr. Dulles set the stage for what has become a fresh, a

positive \<lestern approach to the problems of Germany.
This Congress has also made its contribution.

For one

thing, the Senate took the German question out of the deep-freeze.
It opened the question to full discussion and let in new thought
and new ideas where for years there had been only ritualistic
repetition of the old, the tired and the increasingly unreal.

Dis-

tinguished l1embers of this body, the outstanding Chairman of the

- 7 Foreign Relations Committee (Nr o Fulbright), the Senator from vJest
Virginia (r1r. Byrd), the Senatozo from Pennsylvania (Nr. Clark), the
Senator from Connecticut (Hr. Dodd), the Senato:t: from Kentucky (Mr.
Cooper), the Senator from New Yorlt (l1r. Javits), the Senator from
Alabama (l1r. Sparkman), and others joined in these discussions at
various times.

And out of this many-sided debate emerged, I am

sure, much that was useful for those charged with administering
foreign policy.
The work of the President of the Senate (Mr. Nixon) on
the occasion of his voyage to rrussia and Poland was also of the
greatest importance.

He made an outstanding effort to bridge the

almost unbridgeable gap in understanding between Russia and the
United States and to enlarge the measure of civility in the relations
between the two nations.
Hr. Herter's work at Geneva, in difficult circumstances,
was skillful and dedicated.

In cooperation with other VJestem na•

tions he succeeded in reinterpreting \rJ estern policies with respect
to Germany in the light of today's realities rather than yesterday's
expectations.

He set forth new proposals whose significance is not

likely to be lost on the rest of the world, even though they may
have fallen on deaf ears as regards the Soviet Foreign Minister at
Geneva.

One may hope, even, that their significance will not be

lost on Mr. Khrushchev.

Only last February he indicated that very

similar proposals which I had listed in a speech in the Senate could
form the basis for reasonable negotiation.

Berlin
As for Berlin, Hr. President, that city was and still is
the crux of danger in Germany.

I say that notwithstanding the fact

that the crisis-date which was originally concocted by the Soviet
Union has come and long since gone without serious incident.

I say

that because Berlin in its location, in its continued division and
uncertain status still contains live seeds of conflict.

I say that

because a divided alien occupation of that city--Soviet and Western
alike--is an m1achronism almost a decade and a half after the end
of war.

I say that because the close prmdmity of antagonistic

forces in the legal no-man's land of nerlin constitutes a serious
source of accidental or spontaneous military combustion.
tJhatever it may appear to be from the Soviet point of
view, from the vlestern point of view, I believe, it is time for a
change in Berlin.

But let me stress,

~~.

President, that when I

suggest that it is time for a change I do not mean a change in
Hest Berlin alone, as the communists '<'lould have it.

It is time

for a change in all Berlin.
Because I believe that in any give and take negotiation,
both parts of Berlin must be involved, I find lt disconcerting to
discover that Western diplomacy has permitted the discussion of the
Berlin issue to center more and more on the status of Hest nerlin
alone.

I do not see that this issue--this issue of a dangerously

divided nerlin--is an issue of VJestern troop levels in the city.
Nor is it one of the tyPe of arms which vJestern troops may bear in
that city.

It is not one of whether the Russians will or will not
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guarantee our rights there for one

yea~,

five years or forever.

Yet, these matters \'lere the center of discussion regarding Berlin
at Geneva.

It seems to me that if we mem1 it when we say we shall

stand fast in VJest Berlin, these are not matters for discussion.
To permit talks with the Soviet Union to center on them
seems to me to reveal a temptation to buy the continuance of our
presence in Berlin at the price of unilateral

c~ncessions.

I do

not believe that will work, for the price once paid is likely to go
higher and higher.
bought?

And even if it did work, what would we have

We would have bought nothing more than an indefinite and

expensive prolongation of the present unsatisfactory, costly and
unstable occupation.

We would not have advanced one step towards a

more rational, a more durable peace.
tion continue, Mr. President?

Until when would this occupa-

Until 1970, 19GO, until the year,

2000?

If the issue is not negotiable by a change in the status
of l•Jest Berlin alone, is it negotiable by a change in the status of
all Derlin--of vJest Berlin and East nerlin?

It will not be negoti-

able in these terms if those who use the words of peace are not
prepared to act for peace.

vJe shall not kno\-7 whether that is the

case. however, unless we are clear in our

o~m

minds that we seek,

as a positive act for peace, a new status for all Berlin.

If we

are clear on that point then I bel;eve we may, with profit to all,
assume the advocacy of internationalization of the entire city, on
an interim basis, until it is once again the capital of a unified
Germany.

- 10 Again, let me stress z it is oEe tl':_ing t£._ internationalize
only vJest Berlin under the auspices of the United Nations as the
Russians have proposed.

It would be an entirely different matter

to internationalize the entire city of Berlin--East and west--undeE
those auspices, as an interim arrangement.

In that there might well

be a valid quid pro guo.
In recent days there have been reports that the Russians
are prepared to accept \!Jest Germans as replacements for the nonGerman garrisons nm-1 in vJest Derlin.
whether these reports are accurate.

I have no way of telling
If there is any truth in

I do not see that the idea should be rejected out of hand.

On

them~

the

contrary, the idea may well be advanced for exploration by the
Hestern natiom themselves even if the Russians have not done so.
If Hest Germans can replace other vJestern forces in Derlin and if
Soviet troops are withdrawn from the city, at least the rudiments
of an all-German administration of nerlin will ex-i st.

If this ad-

ministrati. on operated, on an interim basis, under ultimate U.N. or
other international

cont~ol, ~·lith

guaranteed rights of free access

to all from all directions, a ne't-1 and more durable situation might
exist in nerlin than that which now prevails.
I should be less than frank, £1'1r. Pres1_dent, i f I did not
state my view that we have not yet suffic-iently eltplored the potential role of the United Nations and vJest Germans in the Berlin situation.

I think there is time to remedy that shortcoming.

Indeed,

it might well be done in conjunction with the coming exchanges between Mr. Eisenhower and Hr. Khrushchev.
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Hestern Europe
Turning to another major aspect of the international
situation, I should like to consider briefly the state of relations
among the vJestern European nations and among the N.A. T .o. members.
There have always been differences among these nations; that is not
in itself the problem.

The problem is that in recent years short-

range differences have threatened increasingly to overbalance the
long-range cohesive forces which hold the Western nations together.
That is the danger, Hr. President.
cally,

\~hich

It is a danger, ironi-

does not come primarily from the Russians although they

have long sought the disruption of the alliance.

Rather it comes

primarily from developments vdthin the He stern alliance itself.
And, ironically, the danger comes in part from the very success of
the alliance.
The sense of restored security, the prosperity and progress of recent years has permitted national clashes of interest
\•7ithin the very institutions which did so much to bring about the
i!'Q]g'ovement in the Hestern nations.

This is evident in the decline

of respect for the military command of H.A.T.O. and it is evident
in the clash of economic purpose as between the Inner Six of the
European Common Harket and the outer ring of European nations which
is forming i n self-defense or for the purposes of economic countermeasures.

It is evident, too, in the tendency of a legitimate na-

tional pride sometimes

to give way to a auestionable national con-

ceit which sees itself as the sole source of wisdom and leadership
for the vJest.

•'

- 12 If present tendenc:l.es :m t:1e

~Jes-:.:ern

a.lJ.iance pe:::-sist,

1 am afraid it ·1:1ill not be long before the handv1riting will be very
evident on the v1all.

Increasin3ly, individual states or inner

groups of states, in pursuit of their own immediate national advantage and oblivious or indifferent to the needs of others will
spur the rest to the same course.

The short-range interests of

each shall take precedence over the long-range needs of all and to
the degree that they do so the house of vJestern unity, built with
great care and at great

e~~pense, ~-Jill

be threatened.

To be sure,

the institutions are likely to l:'emain but they w::11 be, increasingly,
stripped of substance.
I do not know whether present trends can be

rev~~~

I do not lmow how much influence the United States can exert to
that end.

The fact is that major changes have tal:en place vlithin

Hestern Europe in recent years.

The effect,

~rhaQS

the inevitable

effect, of these changes has been to reduce the ·:nfluence of the
United States and to heighten that of the Europeans themselves in
European

affa~rs.

It "t-lill serve no useful purpose to

~-Jring

our hands over

this situation, to look for scapegoats, or to continue to bury the
problem in words of unity and immodest presumptions of American
leadership as usual.

P-ather, it will be better to learn to live

with the changes in Europe "t-Jhich ue did so much to bring about
with the i1arshall Plan and our actual postwar leadership.

'lJhat is

important now is to try to preserve "t-Jhat needs to be preserved, to
try to preserve the essentials of Uestern unity.

..
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It is helpful, I
Europe.

bel:·-e~.!.-tha~

the

P:-cesid~nt

has gone to

He is, in his person, one of the great symbols of \rlestern

cooperation.

I do not think, however, that symbols are enough.

Not even 't'7ell-spoken words of unity are enough.

He have had those

at every conference of the Hestern nations but the differences have
continued to accumulate.
I believe the time

.ha~

come to put aside the generaliza-

tions on unity and to look squarely at, and talk frankly to, the
points of disunity in the \:Jestern all:!..an.ce.

I think the time has

come for a blunt conference which puts the cards on the table 't'lith
respect to the condition of H.A.T.O.
tent of the erosion.

~ve

He need to delineate the ex-

neeC. to determine what revisions are neces-

sary to revitalize this organization and other institutions of
l'·1 estern unity in the light of the changing European situation.

In

short we need to face what it is that is bothering the members of
the Hestern alliance -if we are to do anything constructive about
the difficulties.
I think the time has come, especially 2 for a frank conference on the economic rivalries which are beginn·lng to plague the
European nations and which, sooner or later, 't'lill_make their effect
felt on this country.
It may be, finally, that the time has come for us to move
out of the full glare of the spotl·i ght of NATO activity and to
welcome fromthe Europeans--l3rit·lsh.z French, Italians, Germans, and
others--the assumption of a greater measure of leadership in its
undertakings, a greater measure of responsibility and contribution

- 14 -

in Europe.

T

trust that this observation will not be interpreted

as an advocacy of
tended as such.

P~erican with~rawal

from Europe.

It is not in-

I:.ather, ·i t is intended as a frank recognition that

circumstances have changed in Europe and, in consequence, a change
in the position of the United States in I·Testern European affairs may
also be warranted and desirable.

The /unericas
Turning ne:Kt to Latin L'.merica, Nr. President, it seems
pa~t~cularly

to me that the situation,
uncertain one.

in the Caribbean, is a most

It is going to require patience and great effort

by all of the American states if a series of little vlars spawned
by

d~ctatorship

and

revolut~on

months or, perhaps, even

yea~s

is not to

pla~~e

that region for

to come.

Ohen a revolut i onary fervor, nurtured on years of oppression and brutal:.". ty achieves i ts ends, perhaps
inevitable.

counter-e~~cesses

are

Tyranny ·is gr-:rn bus -> ness and it is not surprising that

it produces revolut i ons which are also grim i n the ir consequences.
Dut, I1r.
e~~cesses.

Pres~dent,

there comes a moment for an end to

There comes a t 1me to settle down to construction of the

ne"t-J after destruct ·~ on of the old, a time to put aside the fury, if
the high ideals which dr·ive men to understandable revolt are not
to be lost ;~n a con t'1nu1ng
·

~~
~

ow of blood and hatred.

I hope that moment will not be lost 1n the situation in
the Car .:.bbean.

If it is not l _os_t_, _!h~re is reason to bel:teve that

..
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~-1e

are at the beginnings of a

beg:2.E_r!._~- o2 -~2-~e::: ~c!.....Prma5.s i ng

era

in inter-American relations.
e~~pression

This new stirring, I believe, found official
in the recent Declaration of Santiago.

Unless I mis i nterpret that

document, it points to a further evolution in inter-American relations.

The Americas 2 I believe.L may be on

~h.e

verge of

brin~

into the Good Neighbor

concept--~nto

tion--anothe~ concept~

that of the Conscience of the Americas.

the doctrine of non-intervenIf

this i nterpretation is correct, i t means that as the Hemisphere deplores intervention in the affairs of one
deplores egually the bruta1

den~al,

nation~

another, it

by dictatorship, of basic human

decency anywhere in the hemisphere.
Good Neighbors normally stay out of each other's family
affairs and those who me?dle or intervene are rightfully condemned.
I3ut sometimes the affairs ·i n one house reach such a point of tyranny
that good neighbors can no longer be indifferent to the agony of
injustice and brutalitx

wh ~ch

emanates from it.

No single American

nation can decide when that point has been reached.
or three.

Not even two

Dut, ·it seems to me that when t:v10-thirds or three-

quarters of the American republics reach such a conclusion, then
the good conscience of the entire community is involved and the
community has a responsibi 'J i ty to do someth:.ng about it.

In time 2

Ur. Pres ··dent, we shall find ways, common ~·mys, ·inter-American
ways, to

mal~e

the d·i staste and ·: ndignati on of the Americas felt

by those '-1ho outrage the conscience of the Amer·l cas.

?erhaps, then,

we shall see an end to the cycle of di ctatorsh1p, revolution,

•I

- 16 dictatorship which for, too long, has been the curse of many
of this

~arts

hem~sphere.

For our part, l'·'lr. Pres::.dent, I believe our policies are
evolving to adjust to the chang:1..ng concept "1hich I have just outlined, as well as to other new needs of inter-American relations.
The change comes in good time because, for years, we have been
consuming the goodwill which the Good Neighbor policy of another
generation created.

The :i.ntentions of the people of the United

States, as expressed in the Congress these past few years, have
been good,

Uhere "tve have failed is

~\.n

the administration of policy.

In that connection, we have shmm a singular lack of awareness of
the changes in attitudes, hopes, needs and values in Latin America.
In consequence, we failed to develop the nev1 ideas, the alert
leadership and the inspired official representation in Latin
Pmerica which would permit us to act in accord with these changes.
Now that defect is, I hope, in the process of

be~ng

remedied.

The initiative has come largely from the Congress.

I

have in mind particularly the uork of the Subcommittee under the
Chairmanship of the Senator from Oregon (Hr. Horse), and the bold
and constructive ideas of the Senator from Flor:i.da (Hi:, Smathers)
who has shown such a consistent and intelligent interest in that
area.

I believe, too, that the :!.ncreasing currency "t·l hich has been

given in this country to t he vieus of the dist::.nguished Governor of
Puerto D:!.co (l1r. 1-iunoz l1arin) and to the Puerto llican
generally has been most helpful.

e~cperience
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Hr. President, I should like !Q_..§.dd one
t i on to these remarks on the Amer·: cas.

furt~1er

observa-

vJhen we talk of the .Ameri-

cas, scarcely, i f ever, i s Cc:,nada included i n our thoughts.
i s not merely oversight.
usage beh-i nd i t.

That

It is a habit of mind with decades of

It seems to me that it is high time to raise the

quest i on as to "t·l hether this habit of mind

cont inu~ to

have validit,I

i n the m·i d-t\venti eth century or v1hether i t survives on sheer 5.nert:ta
alone.
Personally, I believe that it is the latter.

Congress

has taken a s i gni ficant i n i tiative in recent years, i n remedying
this s i t uati on.

I am thin:.dng now of the work of the Canadian-

United States Interparli maentary Group.
"t'lorl~

On

the Senate side, thi s

i s be i ng carri ed out under the Chai rmanshi p of the able, con-

structi ve, and conscienti ous Senator from Vermont (ftlr. Aiken) and
~contr i bution

has been an outstanding one.

Mr. Pres i dent, I recogni ze that Canada has far flung
_commitments, in the Commonv1ealth, i n the United Nations and i n
other a ssoc i at i ons.

I "tvonder, however, "tvhether the time has not

come for the Ameri can Republi cs to recogni ze t hat Canada i s also
of the Ameri cas and may have much to offer and to gain by closer
assoc i at i on wi th the other nati ons of this hem-: sphere?

vJhat I am

suggest ::.ng, Nr . Pres -I dent, i s that i t may be desirable to undertake
i n the Canadian-Uni ted States parl::.amentary meeti ngs and ·i n other
appropr::.ate ways. a preliminary

e~::p lorat ion

to determine whether or

not Canadi an membershi p i n, or assoc i ation wi th the Organizati on of
the P~erican States may not be of benefi t to all concerned.

·'

- 13 Othe3: L\-reas
Cur attention of late, Hr . President, has been fi:it.ed on
Germany, Europe and Latin America.
being world-wide,

't~e

nut the scope of our relations

may anticipate that from time to time other

nations, other areas will move into the forefront of our awareness.
Rarely in the spot-light, yet never far from it is the
emerging continent of

ne~;r

nations in Africa.

Since 1951, six in-

dependent countries have appeared in regions which were formerly
colonies.

I believe that

1;~e

have a good chance to get off on the

right foot \'lith these ne"t-;r nations.

Certainly, the Department of

State in response to the 5..nitiat::.ve of Congress, has reorganized
in a fash5..on which creates a better opportunity ·t o bring about
that result.

Heretofore, African affairs were buried in separate

niches in the various European Desks.

Now, however, on the basis

of legislation pressed by the Qistinguished Chairman-Emeritus of
the Foreign Relations Committee (Hr. Green) there is an Assistant
Secretary

o~

State for African Affairs.

This means among other

things, tir. President, that official information and evaluations
with respect to the African nations no longer are passed through
the

viev~oint

of other countries and areas before they flow into

total United States policy.

In short, Hr. 1?resident, the indepen-

dent nations of Africa now stand on an equal footing with those of
Europe, Asia and elsewhere, as far as the machinery of our foreign
policy is concerned.
Elsewhere in the world, Hr. President, with rare exceptions, \ve are just muddling along in the patterns of past policy,
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achievements leading to a greater stability and progress in those
areas and, hence, to more benefici al relations 't'l:.th them in the
f-uture.
In the Hiddle East, for example, we find the same ten-

dencies, as in the past, to transfer high official hopes, almost
i n desperati on, from ruler to ruler, from nation to nati on, as the
sands of internati onal political intrigue in that region shift
f i rst in one direction and then in another.

The Eisenhower Doc-

trine, as many of us anticipated at the time i t \'las enunciated,
l i es almost buried in these sands.

The Daghdad Pact acguires a

new name but even less content.
And still, the real problems of the H2.ddle East r emain:
The refugees; the deni al of the use of Suez on an equal basis to
all; the monstrous poverty and ignorance of the many in the midst
of the vast wealth and culture of the few; the border questions
and the smolderi ng hatred and suspi cion between Israeli and Arab.
Hone of these--the real problems of the Niddle East--appear to be
any closer to solution than they 't·;rere a decade ago.

Nevertheless

the outpouri ng of publi c funds for the regi on goes on in the bland
assumpti on that we are doi ng somethi ng about these problems.

How

much longer, ilr. Presi dent?
Sooner or later, in the admini strati on of

pol ~ cies

with

respect to the i1iddle East we are going to have to make up our
minds.

Sooner or later we are goi ng to have to face the fact that,

for thi s nati on as a whole, there are some things more important

,. .
2 .j

-

than r,liddle Eastern oil,

mil~.tary

-

bases or the soothing of the

ultra-nationalistic tantrums of one nation or another.
Sooner or later, 't<7e are going to have to decide who in
the Middle East works sincerely and with forebearance to end the
state of fear and incipient

~t-Jar

which prevails in that region and

who :;.ntrigues to perpetuate it.
which goven1ments render a

1:-Je are going to have to decide

~ecent

measure of justice to their

peoples and act for their peaceful progress and 'ivhich governments
exploit their passions for selfish or destructive ends.
Hhen we have made these decisions then, perhaps, we may
be able to devise policies for \·l hich

~tJe

need not apologize, poli-

cies which "-Jill have some strength to stand in the midst of political intrigue and

aga~nst

the

~nroads

of conwrunism into the region·-

policies v7h::.ch vJill begin to bring to an end the largely indiscriminate use of public funds for v1hat are often self-defeating
purposes.
Further to the East, Hr. President, moving tm-Jards the
Pacific, there is little in the situation in which to find comfort.
\Je go on, as He have been doing for years, spending, \-lith little
question, vast sums of public funds, at best to hold a line against
communism.

Yet despite this outpouring, the line shm'ls signs of

breaking down in a Laos just a fe,.·J months after 't·7e have been told
that foreign aid had built the line solid in that country.

And

when a situation of that kind arises, lJhen it catches us unaware,
what is the answer, Hr. President?
the same pattern as in the past.

Hore of the same; more aid in
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As for stab:a:U:y and progress in ar..y of these nations,
except in Japan and in India and one or two isolated spots, there
is little evidence of tt.

The lot of vast populations remains just

about as miserable as ever; the enticements of authoritarianism
are as intense as ever.

I repeat, Hr. President, as far as United

States policies in As·i a are concerned, they constitute, largel:L_
an enormously costly holding action from Korea to Pa!dstan and a
reli~EJ-lity!.- Horeqver,

holding action of very dub:i.ous
dent, they constitute a
ing overtones.

hold ~ ng

Nr. Presi-

action which is developing disturb-

I refer to what is4

app~~ntly,

a trend towards

military or quasi-military authoritarian dictatorships in southern
and southeast Asia.

Those t·7ho administer our pol 1 cies seem in-

clined to look the other

t~ay,

to finL_the rationalizations

put off the facing of the realities ·;nherent in th:i.s trend.
be sure, one can find good in the development.

To

Hi l·i tary dictator-

ships produce more stability and order. at first.
to deal with, at first.

wl~

They are easier

They even promise a measure of progress

away from the corrupt-i on, the inertia, the inadequacy that characterized many of the predecessor governments, at first.
I3ut, Hr. President, no person bred :i_n this nation--alive
to its premi se that man is

f·~ t

to govern himself--no person bred

in that tradition can look with equanim·i ty, much less with eagerness, on the appearance of military or quasi-military regimes in
so many lands with which we are intimately assoc·i ated.

I must ask,

Hr. President, is this the only answer which freedom can pose to
communism?

• I
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I can only express the hope

th~

those

~,Jho

are r:esponsi-

ble for the adm-inistration of our policies and particularly our aid
programs kno"J "td:lat they are doing.

I can only

eiq~ress~

hope_ that

this military-at1.thoritarian trend :!.n non-Commun:::.st i\sia is a temporary phenonemon, that ·: t is a step towards responsible and popularly responsive government in these lands.
There are things worse than instability in this 1;vorld
and one of them is the ·lron hand of tyranny--communist or s.ny other.
I cannot

lool~

w·· th pr·l de on any action of th:!.s _g_ovet'Tlmer; advertent

or inadvertent, that acts to close that hand on any people--no, not
even in the mistaken zeal that this 'tvill somehO'i-·7 save them and us
from communism.

Administrat~on

of Policy

In my remarks so far, Nr . President, I have been discussi.ng matters over which, for the most part, 'tve do not--as a
nation--exercise unilateral control.

\-Jhat happens in the Far East,

the Hiddle East, in Europe, the Americas or elsewhere is not "t-lithin
our capacity alone to determine.

Nor i s the responsibility for

developments there uni.quely that of this Administration or any
other.

In most parts of the vlorld our inflnence ranges from im-

portant to peripheral but, in a practical sense, i t is not absolute
anywhere and the sooner we disabuse ourselves of any idea that it
is, the sooner we shall use with greater deftness, with less waste
of public resources, such influence as we do possess.

.'
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There is an aspect of foreign relat:'..ons,
·7

~1mqever,

wh:'..ch

s wholly uith;n the province of the United States, 'Nherein respon~ests

sibility
~-1hich

we

ma~~e

solely with this nation.

I refer to the manner in

up our minds in foreign policy and, after we have

made it up, what 'tve do and the way we do it.
the formulation and administration of

In short, I refer to

polic~.

Other nations do not tell this nation what to decide, as
regards

~ts

foreign relations.

To be sure the attitudes of others,

the circumstances abroad, our relationships with others influence
our decisions.

Indeed they should, for we are not a nation in a

pressurized nose-cone some\vhere off in space.
the rest of the

~vorlcl,

decide for ourselves.

not·Nithstanding, in the last analysis, we
He act for o•.2rselves.

c isions or \·1rong ciecisi.ons.
a result.

Dut awareness of

vJe make right de-

He act intelligently or foolishly as

And we bear the responsibility for these national de-

cisions and actions.

In short, the buck-passing stops or should

stop at the water's edge.

He--not others--determ·1 ne for what pur-

pose we have a State Department, an aid-administration, a Central
Intelligence Agency, an Information Service anc a host of other
_a genc ies vJhich carry on activities abroad on the basis of appro£riations from public funds and on behalf of the enti re nation.
He alone

d~£j._de

hm-1 they shall funct i on.

Uhen I use the term '1·Je, 11 Hr. Pres ident, I mean, of
course, the people of the United States.

In matters of foreign

relations, however, the responsibility for interpreting what we
want and how we are to pursue i t rests, in a theoretical sense,

vJith the elected President, acting in some ::nstances vlith the advice
and consent of the elected Senate and in others with the concurrence
of the elected Congress.
That is the Constitutional theory, Hr. :?resident, but v1hat
is the fact'?

The fact is that the pov1er to interpret the will of

the nation in respect to our vast and complicated relations with
eno~

the rest of the world has been diffused through the
labyrinth of the

EJ~ecutive

I3ranch of the government.

The pov1er to

decide, in short, has been scattered and diluted to the ,point v1here
it has become virtually

impossib~e

to fix responsibility.

It has

been scattered and diluted to the point where it has become virtually impossible to use the public pov1er effectively to bring
about adjustments in policy and ·' ts

adm~nistration

at somewhere near

the time that these ad·justments are needed.
In these
come so

~ntenmven

c~rcumstance3,

national interests freguently be-

"tJitL bureaucrati c interests and conflicts that

'1;-Je are less and less able to adjust the total needs of the nation
to the changing circumstances o::= the Horld.
a policy determined by

Ejcecut~ve

Hore and more we have

agency accommodation ancl less and

less by the leadership and decision of the respons·:ble political
officials of the Adrninistrat:on and the Congress.

I believe the

able Senator from Hinnesota (Nr. a umphrey) illustrated this point
most forcibly a short time ago on the floor vJith regard to policy
formulation on the testing of nuclear v1eapons.

He shm'led how

agency confl~cts were producing a situation that undercut our

-

negotiators i.n Geneva.

r

r

L....i

-

His statement apparently \Jas heard at the

Hhite House for the President made a decision on this question
shortly thereafter.

Bt'.t, l1r. President, thi.s is the kind of de-

cision \<1hich should be forthcoming promptly with:i.n the Administration on the basis of need.

It ou2ht not to

requ~re

prodding from

the Senate.
I realize that
a long time.

th~s

problem has been with the nation for

It is not amenable to easy solution.

Hr. President,

'li1e

must deal

~1ith

Nevertheless,

it, if responsible government in

the field of foreign policy is not to degenerate into a catchphrase.

~.Ye

mu.st stay with this problem--the President and the

Congress--until it yields to rational solution.
The able Senator from nashington (Hr. Jackson) has recognized the deplorable creaki.ness of the decision-making machinery
of the nation in critical matters of foreign relations and defense.
He has supplied the initiative and set in motion a special Senate
:lnvestj_gation of the problem which has been promised the cooperation
of the Administration.

That coo~eration is essential because re-

sponsibility for this problem rests primarily and preponderantly
with the Administration.
I should like to suggest, Nr. Presi dent, that we may
find the way to a reasonable

solut~on

to this problem in a diligent

assertion of the primary authority of the Presidency in matters
directly or ~ndirectly relatecl to foreign policy and a reassertionz
under the President, of the respons i bi lity of the Secretary and
the Department of State for the conduct of foreign relations.
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:_s

not organi zed to handle

these matters in thei r totality, then let us reorganize it.
is not

egu~pped,

then let

~s

equi p it.

!f its nersonnel
- is not
(

properly trained, then let us seek to provide the training.
it has not

se ff~c i ent

resources,

If it

f~nancial

or

othe~q i se,

If

then let

us mal:e these resources available to it.
Dut let us not, i n an effort to compensate for the real
or imagined shortcomings of the Department of State so scatter
responsibili ties in forei gn relati ons through the
ments, the

agr~cultural

~ilitary

depart-

department, the I.C.A., the C.I.A., the

Commerce Department or whatever 7 that the costs of administeri ng
fore i gn pol-l cy r ·i se enormously and, i n rat i o, the constructi ve
results decli ne

drast:~cal1y.

He have already carri ed this process

so far that i n our offi cial representati on abroad, the employees
of the Department of State, numerous as they may be, are i n many
instances far outnumoered by the representat1ves of other United
States agencies.

And although the Department of State bears ulti-

mate respons i bi l i ty for rel at; ons abroad, i t

e:~erc i ses

only the

most nomi nal i nfluence over the use of the resources and the act i ons
oj:_ t_h_e__persopnel of these other agenci es.
I beli eve thi s sessi on of the 06th Congress has made a
highly s i gn:i.f:':. cant advance vJhi ch can act to bri ng about a major
improvement i n the admi nistrati on of fore i gn relati ons.

I refer

to the authori zing legislati on whi ch the Congress has passed in
the field of foreign-ai d.

If i t i s reasonabl y i nterpreted by the
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Administration, this legislation, as extensively amended by Congress, can act to fix authority and responsibility for this significant undertaking much more ·decisively, than is now the case.
Cne amendment provides for an inspector-general in the Department
of State to probe the weaknesses in every aspect of the aidprogram.

A second provides for the ending of the non-security re-

lated secrecy which has surrounded this program.

Still another

separates military aid from other forms of aid but provides for
close control over the entire program by the Secretary of State.
Finally, Mr. President, a fourth amendment requires the

~cecutive

Branch to submit plans for the gradual termination of massive
grants, as the program moves more and more to a loan basis.
amendments,

~~.

These

President, can do much to end aid by force of habit

and to give to the program more purpose and direction within the
context of our total policy.

They can reduce the waste and any

tendencies towards corrupt practices.
The Congressional action on foreign aid, Mr. President,
is only a first step in bringing about a more integrated, streamlined and responsible administration of the nation's international
affairs.

Much remains to be done in regard to other agencies which

have injected themselves or have been inje.c ted into these matters
without adequate coordination under the Secretary of State and
without adequate control by the elected officials of this government.

,•

,

.
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Concluding Comments
t1r. President, I have talked at great length today.

But

there is much that needs saying on this subject of the nation's
foreign relations and their administration, much more than I have
said.

I wanted these thoughts, hm-1ever, to be on the Record at

this time.

For, in the near future, discussions will be raking

place between the President and Mr. l<hrushchev and others of the
highest importance to the nation.

It is possible to question the

wisdom of these meetings at this point in time and circumstance,
as has been done.

But the decision to hold them has been made by

the President and, at a recent press conference, he put the significance of these meetings in proper perspective when in response
to questions as to their propriety he stated:

i•vJe are talking

about the human race and what's going to happen to it:1 and

11

any

President that refused finally to use the last atom of prestige
or the last atom of his energy /In this quest for

peac~7 • • •

ought to be condemned by the American people • .:
Yet these impending discussions--however sell-intentioned
--are but a part of the search for a better road for this nat!on
and mankind.

The work of securing the t'lell-being and the peace of

the people of the United States will not end wi th the impending
exchanges.
be done if

He shall be better prepared to do what still needs to
\ole

understand more clearly the

~.;orld~·;ide

dimensions of

the undertaking which confronts us, if we ready our spirits and
determination for the
make possible.

tasl~s

which the impending conferences may

